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Introduction 
 
 
Germany and the Role of 
Nuclear Weapons 
Between Prohibition and Revival 
Oliver Meier 
Never since the end of the Cold War have the international community and Europe 
been so deeply divided over the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. There is 
disagreement within the United Nations over whether to begin negotiations on a treaty 
banning nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and 
Moscow’s associated nuclear threats have triggered a new discussion in NATO about 
enhancing its nuclear deterrent. Both debates are difficult and uncomfortable for 
Berlin, because they undermine the incremental arms control approach favoured by 
Germany. Against the background of the upcoming July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw 
and the forthcoming establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament in 
Geneva, Berlin must adopt a clear stance on nuclear deterrence if it is to play an active 
role in shaping the outcome of these discussions. 
 
On 7 December 2015, 138 states voted in 
the UN General Assembly in favour of 
establishing a working group to discuss 
further nuclear disarmament steps. The 
Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) will 
meet in Geneva for three weeks in the 
course of 2016 “to substantively address 
concrete effective legal measures, legal 
provisions and norms that will need to be 
concluded to attain and maintain a world 
without nuclear weapons”. A similar work-
ing group convened in Geneva in 2013 
without achieving substantial progress. 
Although it enjoys the support of coun-
tries such as Austria, Brazil and Ireland, the 
initiative is highly controversial. Many 
NATO members fear that the working group 
is a ploy to pave the way for talks on a treaty 
banning nuclear weapons. The three NATO 
nuclear weapons states – France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States – therefore 
voted against the relevant UN Resolution, 
as did almost all the Alliance’s Central 
European members. Germany and all other 
“old” NATO members abstained. 
A similar divide characterises the debate 
about a possible revision of NATO’s nuclear 
weapons policy. Some Central European 
states are demanding a greater role for 
nuclear weapons in order to more credibly 
deter further Russian aggression in Europe. 
Western European members, on the other 
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hand, largely wish to preserve the status 
quo. They fear a nuclear arms race in 
Europe and doubt that nuclear threats 
would positively influence Russia’s behav-
iour. 
The Movement for a 
Nuclear Ban Treaty 
Since the signing of the New START Treaty 
in 2010, in which Moscow and Washington 
agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear 
arsenals, nuclear arms control has been 
deadlocked. As a result, the Humanitarian 
Initiative, which brings together a colourful 
and disparate coalition of governments and 
NGOs, over the past two years has dominat-
ed discussions about further disarmament 
steps. What unites the group is the convic-
tion that nuclear disarmament is unlikely 
to progress through small, incremental 
steps. Instead, it is argued, disarmament 
should be driven by principled arguments 
and approached from the angle of delegiti-
mising nuclear arms. Three international 
conferences, attended by a growing number 
of states and NGOs, which pointed out 
that no state or international organisation 
alone would be able to cope with the con-
sequences of any use of nuclear weapons, 
were the starting point for the current de-
bate over the Humanitarian Initiative. 
More than 150 states participated in the 
most recent December 2014 conference in 
Vienna. For the first time, two nuclear 
weapon states, namely, the United Kingdom 
and the United States attended. Most of the 
participants saw the humanitarian conse-
quences of nuclear weapons as grounds to 
demand a comprehensive ban. 
Austria, as the host of the Vienna meet-
ing, initiated the “Humanitarian Pledge”, 
which asserts that the lack of a ban on 
nuclear weapons in the NPT (Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) 
represents a “legal gap”. In the meantime, 
121 states have backed the Pledge and prom-
ise to work to “stigmatise, prohibit and 
eliminate nuclear weapons”. However, the 
statement contains no unequivocal call for 
a ban treaty. No NATO member has signed 
the statement. 
The subsequent debate in the UN Gen-
eral Assembly’s First Committee in autumn 
2015 revealed that supporters were pursu-
ing rather diverging objectives in subscrib-
ing to the Humanitarian Initiative. From 
their ranks, four similar resolutions were 
tabled, focusing on the “ethical dimension” 
or the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. 
Mexico’s initiative to set up the OEWG rep-
resented the lowest common denominator 
with respect to next steps. The working 
group is to discuss “effective measures” and 
norms for achieving the goal of a world 
without nuclear weapons. 
The OEWG will not apply the consensus 
rule that is otherwise sacrosanct in arms 
control. The nuclear weapon states pro-
tested sharply against the possibility of de-
cisions being taken by majority vote. With-
out a veto, they fear lack control over the 
outcome and intend to boycott the Geneva 
discussions. It is an open question whether 
states that abstained, like Germany, will 
participate in the OEWG. Berlin has reiter-
ated that talks about a treaty banning nu-
clear weapons would only make sense if the 
nuclear weapon states also participated in 
them. 
A New Nuclear Debate in NATO 
While the UN discusses a world without 
nuclear weapons, the Ukraine conflict has 
triggered a debate within NATO about 
whether and to what extent nuclear weap-
ons could and should contribute to deter-
ring Russia from further aggression, above 
all against NATO itself. 
The constellation is a reverse mirror-
image of the discussion that Germany set in 
motion in 2009, together with other West-
ern European states, about reducing the 
role of nuclear weapons in European secu-
rity. Encouraged by US President Barack 
Obama’s speech in April 2009, in which he 
announced that the United States would 
take a leading role in abolishing all nuclear 
weapons, the new centre-right German 
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government promised in its coalition 
agreement to “advocate within the Alliance 
and with our American allies the removal 
of the remaining nuclear weapons from 
Germany”. However, the initiative faltered 
because of French and Central European 
resistance and the lack of US backing. 
Today, the same Central Europeans that 
objected to change in 2009 and 2010 argue 
that vis-à-vis Russia, the visibility of NATO’s 
instruments of nuclear deterrence needs to 
increase. They would like NATO’s nuclear 
doctrine and declaratory policy – i.e. the 
description of possible scenarios for the use 
of nuclear weapons – to be updated. Accord-
ing to their view, it would be possible to 
dust off some older deterrence instruments. 
NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, for exam-
ple, states that: “Nuclear weapons make a 
unique contribution in rendering the risks 
of aggression against the Alliance incalcu-
lable and unacceptable.” The document 
also declares that nuclear forces must pos-
sess “the necessary characteristics and 
appropriate flexibility and survivability, to 
be perceived as a credible and effective 
element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing 
war”. The new 2010 Strategic Concept drops 
these formulations. While deterrence is still 
referred to as a “core element” of NATO’s 
overall strategy, the Alliance now describes 
the circumstances under which any nuclear 
weapons use might be considered as “ex-
tremely remote”. 
A tighter integration of nuclear weapons 
into defence planning is also conceivable 
by more closely linking conventional and 
nuclear defence and deterrence capabilities. 
The growing role of nuclear weapons could 
be documented by including nuclear-capa-
ble systems in exercises and holding more 
frequent and more realistic manoeuvres. 
British Secretary of State for Defence 
Michael Fallon made precisely such sugges-
tions following a meeting of the NATO Coun-
cil in October. Further, the time required 
to make US nuclear weapons stationed in 
Europe operational could also be reduced. 
Currently, the Alliance measures the time-
frame during which the highest level of 
readiness can be achieved in weeks. In insti-
tuting such steps, NATO would be following 
the example set by Russia, which since the 
annexation of Crimea has demonstrated the 
integration of its conventional and nuclear 
forces in a series of exercises. 
The most far-reaching proposals are 
those suggesting changing NATO’s deploy-
ment patterns. In the context of nuclear 
sharing, there are currently believed to be 
about 180 US nuclear weapons stationed in 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Turkey. In early December, the freshly 
appointed Polish deputy defence minister, 
Tomasz Szatkowski, caused a stir when he 
appeared to suggest that Warsaw might be 
interested in having US nuclear weapons 
deployed on Polish territory. Even if the 
Polish ministry of national defence later 
walked back his statements, Szatkowski 
had called into question the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act. The promises made by NATO 
in 1997 in this politically binding document 
include not deploying nuclear weapons on 
the territory of new NATO members. Ger-
many would like to preserve the NATO-
Russia Founding Act. 
What Next? 
In 2016, Germany will have to take a stance 
on the role of nuclear weapons in the dis-
cussions in the OEWG in Geneva and in 
NATO. The German Government’s White 
Paper on Security Policy and the Future of 
the German Armed Forces, which is due to 
be published in 2016, is also likely to con-
tain a passage on the role and purpose of 
nuclear sharing arrangements. The Euro-
pean Union is expected to adjust its disar-
mament goals in the course of the revision 
of the European Security Strategy, which is 
due to be completed by the summer. 
Germany could respond to these contra-
dictory expectations by joining demands 
for an enhanced nuclear deterrent or by 
backing the supporters of a nuclear ban 
treaty. However, either of these options 
would amount to a break with existing 
German arms control, disarmament and 
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non-proliferation policies. That would risk 
Berlin isolating itself from partners and 
allies and harming the credibility of Ger-
man arms control policy.  
It would appear more sensible to clearly 
define the foundations of the German stance 
and, on that basis, influence the discourse 
about the next steps in nuclear disarma-
ment and the possible revision of NATO’s 
nuclear weapons policy. In the United 
Nations, such an approach would mean 
participating actively in the OEWG. It is 
clear that a treaty that ultimately rejects 
nuclear deterrence would contradict the 
role of NATO as a “nuclear alliance”. 
Below this threshold, however, there are 
issues that could be usefully discussed in 
the OEWG. These include the question of 
the security preconditions for further dis-
armament steps, the role of security guar-
antees, and possibilities for greater open-
ness and transparency on nuclear weapons. 
Participating in the OEWG is not without 
its risks. Under its majority voting rules, 
the OEWG’s final report could potentially 
fail to adequately reflect minority positions. 
High-profile statements on nuclear dis-
armament by prominent representatives of 
the German government could help to pre-
vent Germany being co-opted by the sup-
porters of a nuclear weapons ban treaty. 
The German Bundestag subcommittee on 
disarmament, arms control and non-prolif-
eration could also provide critical guidance 
to Germany’s participation in the working 
group through hearings and resolutions. 
A debate about revising the Alliance’s 
nuclear doctrine is likely to be unavoidable 
during and after the mid-2016 Warsaw 
NATO summit. Here, Germany should seek 
to assert its own positions vigorously, in 
concert with like-minded states. Above all, 
the risks that any increase in the role of 
nuclear weapons pose to crisis stability, 
Alliance cohesion and global non-prolifera-
tion efforts need to be highlighted. In the 
short term, priority could be granted to 
those topics that both proponents of stron-
ger nuclear deterrence and supporters of 
further disarmament regard as particularly 
important. The former hope that greater 
transparency concerning nuclear weapons 
will make deterrence more credible, the 
latter that it will lead to progress on con-
fidence-building. Both sides also agree that 
the circumstances under which the use of 
nuclear weapons would be conceivable 
need to be defined more precisely. One side 
sees this as a way to create a more effective 
deterrent, the other regards it as a way to 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons. 
A revision of the fundamental principles 
of nuclear policy, as defined in NATO’s 2012 
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review 
report, should wait for the outcome of a 
thorough and inclusive discussion within 
the Alliance. The timing of the US elections 
opens up a window of opportunity for such 
a debate on the role of nuclear weapons in 
European security. The new Administration 
in Washington is unlikely to be in any posi-
tion to formulate goals for a revised NATO 
nuclear doctrine before mid-2017. So there 
is plenty of time to conduct a broad debate 
within and among NATO member states 
about whether nuclear weapons can con-
tribute to greater security in Europe. 
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